This is a thread about enshrinement. There has been always a push from different sectors to have ePBS without the removal of trusted players. The common saying is "we may be enshrining the bad thing". I want to dispute this vehemently, and this may be a long thread. 1/11

As promised, this is my reminder that ePBS is real now, well studied, implemented, and now supported by the majority of client teams

One interesting extension TimeBoost design allows is to let applications know about "TimeBoosted" transactions, at execution time. This will potentially result into applications adapting their fee mechanisms. If that happens, arbitrageurs using TimeBoost will also adapt to that🧵

I am happy to share that our work won the best paper award! Thanks, @will_wjk, @StefLeonardos and the team for organizing a great conference.

📢 A proposal for Multidimensional Gas Metering in Ethereum L1 Allows to increase block capacity, without changing the block gas limit and without complicating UX. + it can easily be extended to user-friendly multidimensional pricing (endgame 1559!). 👇 tl;dr & links below

There has been a lot of confusion about TimeBoost, especially what it actually does. Some of the following are my personal takeaways about it and some are facts, that you may find interesting: 1. What?: Arbitrum transaction ordering policy before TimeBoost was First-Come First-Serve (FCFS). With TimeBoost it is almost the same: "TimeBoosted" transactions form FCFS order immediately, which gets merged with regular transactions that also form FCFS order with 200ms delay. Importantly, TimeBoost does NOT give right to propose blocks and it does NOT give sequencing rights. 2. Why?: TimeBoost has been primarily designed to shift the investment of arbitrage searchers in latency reduction and infrastructure to chain income, since the former is a lost value to (all types of) users of the chain. Second goal was to reduce reverted transactions due to probabilistic backruns. Third goal was to be as close as possible to FCFS ordering policy. TimeBoost has NOT been designed to maximize the revenue, especially a short term one. 3. How does it perform?: The primary goal is partially achieved, how large is this part is a) hard to calculate, b) needs to be tested over time. The second goal is not yet achieved, but I think it will get better. The third goal is clearly achieved. Overall, I find it an interesting alternative design for transaction ordering to study, from a research perspective, and now with a real life data as well. The auction part of TimeBoost is quite related to execution tickets' idea proposed by Ethereum Foundation researchers.

Looking forward to presenting our paper "MEV Capture Through Time-Advantaged Arbitrage" (with @robin_ethz, @misilva73, @EdFelten, @convoluted_code) at MARBLE conference next week. Full program of the conference: The paper studies the value of TimeBoost coming from CEX-DEX arbitrage and (empirically) compares it to FCFS and PGA auctions.

Looking forward to speaking about TimeBoost today at @ZuBerlinCity.

For backrunning opportunities, we argue that time advantage (e.g. TimeBoost) may dramatically reduce the rate of probabilistic transactions, translating into a "spam": , compared to FCFS, in which all the value is wasted into spam. For the example value distribution obtained by rough estimates, the reduction was to only 15% of the value spent on spam. For some distributions, it can result into 0 value spent on spam.

In a new paper with Benny Sudakov from @ETH_en, we compare Restaking to Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol. First, we look into the sufficient condition that a restaking graph is secure. Under this condition, transforming a restaking graph into secure PoS protocols is always possible.